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THE CONTOURS OF

28 U.S.C. § 1782:

HISTORY AND USES

The United States has long recognized the need to make available to foreign courts and litigants before such courts, information
located in the United States. The availability of information located in the United States enables legal decisionmakers in foreign
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courts to possess the full facts and, therefore, to achieve the fairest
possible adjudication of the claims before them.1 Since 1855, a federal statute has existed with the specific purpose of facilitating discovery in the United States for use in a foreign forum.2 The 1877
version of the statute was highly formalistic in its requirements.
Judicial assistance was available to litigants in a foreign court only
where the request was made, through a letter rogatory, by a foreign
government that was a party to the foreign action and where the
foreign action was for the recovery of money or property.$ However, by 1948, the statute had been expanded for use in any foreign
civil proceeding, revised so that it no longer required the foreign
government to be a litigant in the foreign action, and renumbered
section 1782, title 28 of the United States Code.'
1. "Efficient administration of justice requires that courts encourage, not hamstring,
information exchanges .... " Ward v. Ford Motor Co., 93 F.R.D. 579, 580 (D. Colo. 1982).
2. See Act of March 2, 1855, ch. 140, 10 Stat. 630. The original federal statute was a
subsection of this Act, and it merely gave the power to compel witnesses to a commissioner
who had been appointed by a circuit court to gather information at the request of a foreign
country. For a comparison of the texts of the different versions of the statute, see In re
Letter Rogatory From Justice Court, District of Montreal, Canada, 523 F.2d 562, 566-69
(6th Cir. 1975). See also In re Request for Assistance from Ministry of Legal Affairs of
Trinidad and Tobago, 848 F.2d 1151 (11th Cir. 1988), affg 648 F. Supp. 464 (S.D. Fla.
1986), motion for relief from judg't denied, 117 F.R.D. 177 (S.D. Fla. 1987), cert. denied,
109 S. Ct. 784 (1989).
3. Revised Statutes 4071 (2d ed. 1878), Act of Feb. 27, 1877, ch. 69, 19 Stat. 241.
4. In 1948, the statute read:
The deposition of any witness residing within the United States to be used
in any civil action pending in any court in a foreign country with which the
United States is at peace may be taken before a person authorized to administer
oaths designated by the district court of any district where the witness resides or
may be found.
The practice and procedure in taking such depositions shall conform generally to the practice and procedure for taking depositions to be used in courts of
the United States.
Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 949.
and by striking out
This section was amended in 1949 "by striking out 'residing' .
• . . the words 'civil action' and in lieu thereof inserting 'judicial proceeding'." Act of May
24, 1949, ch. 139, 63 Stat. 103.
The statute appeared in this form until the 1964 amendment, which replaced this section entirely and repealed former § 1785, which had contained a provision that prevented
the taking of evidence in violation of a legal privilege. For the text of the statute after the
1964 amendment, including the rewritten privilege provision, see infra note 7.
The term "pending" was omitted by the 1964 amendment. Most courts and commentators have concluded that the statute no longer requires that the foreign case for which the
material is sought be pending. See, e.g., In re Request for Assistance From Ministry of Legal
Affairs of Trinidad and Tobago, 648 F. Supp. 464 (S.D. Fla. 1986), motion for relief from
judg't denied, 117 F.R.D. 177 (S.D. Fla. 1987), aff'd, 848 F.2d 1151 (11th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 109 S. Ct. 784 (1989). However, at least one court has held otherwise. In the district
court decision in In re Letters of Request to Examine Witnesses From Court of Queen's

19891

28 U.S.C. § 1782

431

By combining the 1949 and 1964 amendments to section 1782,
Congress placed the United States on the cutting edge of assisting
in international discovery.' The 1949 amendment made the statute
available for use in foreign criminal proceedings, and the 1964
amendment seems to have removed the requirement that the foreign case be pending,6 thereby allowing any person "interested" in
the foreign litigation to simply apply directly to a federal district
court for a discovery order, without the need for a letter rogatory
from the foreign court. In its present form, section 17821 gives the
Bench for Manitoba, Canada, 59 F.R.D. 625 (N.D. Cal. 1973), the court quoted from the
letter of transmittal accompanying the 1964 amendment, see infra note 5, at 3792-94, which
referred repeatedly to "litigation" and "litigant." The district court concluded that "[tihe
commissioner's argument that the references to litigation were not intended to limit the
scope of the amendment is not well taken." 59 F.R.D. at 628. The case was affirmed on
appeal with no discussion of whether the statute required "pending litigation." See In re
Letter of Request to Examine Witnesses From Court of Queen's Bench for Manitoba, Canada, 488 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1973).
5. See S. REP. No. 1580, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS

3782 [hereinafter U.S.

CODE CONG.

& ADMIN.

NEWS].

See also Letter of Oscar

Cox, Chairman of the Commission on International Rules of Judicial Procedure, to Hon.
John W. McCormack, Speaker of the United States House of Representatives (May 28,
1963) (letter of transmittal to accompany proposed bill), id. at 3792-94; Letter of President
John F. Kennedy (to accompany bill), id. at 3794.
6. But see infra notes 36-48 and accompanying text.
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (1982) reads in its entirety:
Assistance to foreign and international tribunals and to such litigants before
such tribunals.
(a) The district court of the district in which a person resides or is found may
order him to give his testimony or statement or to produce a document or other
thing for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal. The order
may be made pursuant to a letter rogatory issued, or request made by a foreign
or international tribunal or upon the application of any interested person and
may direct that the testimony or statement be given, or the document or other
thing be produced, before a person appointed by the court. By virtue of his appointment, the person appointed has power to administer any necessary oath
and take the testimony or statement. The order may prescribe the practice and
procedure, which may be in whole or part the practice and procedure of the
foreign country or the international tribunal, for taking the testimony or statement or producing the document or other thing. To the extent that the order
does not prescribe otherwise, the testimony or statement shall be taken, and the
document or thing produced, in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
A person may not be compelled to give his testimony or statement or to
produce a document or other thing in violation of any legally applicable
privilege.
(b) This chapter does not preclude a person within the United States from voluntarily giving his testimony or statement, or producing a document or other
thing, for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal before any
person and in any manner acceptable to him. June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat.
949; May 24, 1949, ch. 139, § 93, 63 Stat. 103; Oct. 3, 1964, Pub. L. 88-619, § 9(a),
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district court virtually complete discretion to decide whether it will
aid the foreign fact-finding process;8 this nearly unbridled discretion is the root of the problems discussed in this Comment.
The 1949 amendment omitted from the statute the phrase "to
be used in any civil action."9 Courts and commentators have interpreted this phrase to mean that section 1782 can be utilized to obtain information for use in foreign and international criminal proceedings as well as civil proceedings, thereby vastly expanding the
reach of foreign discovery in the United States. 10 Indeed, presently,
the statute is being used as much to obtain information pursuant
to foreign criminal proceedings as it is for foreign civil
proceedings. 1
The statute is not to be used for purposes other than discovery. For example, section 1782 cannot be used to enforce a foreign
judgment.1 2 Moreover, section 1782 is not the exclusive means by
78 Stat. 997.
8. See infra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
9. The 1948 version of the statute stated that "the deposition of any witness residing
within the United States to be used in any civil action pending in any court in a foreign
country . . . may be taken . . . ." Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 949. The 1949
amendment stated that "[slection 1782 of title 28, United States Code, is amended by...
striking out from the same paragraph the words 'civil action' and in lieu thereof inserting
'judicial proceeding.'" Act of May 24, 1949, ch. 139, 63 Stat. 103.
10. See In re Letters Rogatory From Tokyo District, Tokyo, Japan, 539 F.2d 1216 (9th
Cir. 1976) (citing In re Letter Rogatory From Justice Court, District Court of Montreal,
Canada, 523 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1975)); Montreal (holding that the omission of the phrase
"civil action" meant that the statute could be used to gather information for criminal actions as well as civil actions). See also U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws, supra note 5, at
3789; Amram, Public Law No. 88-619 of October 3, 1964 - New Developments in International Judicial Assistance in the United States of America, 32 J.B.A. D.C. 24, 32 (1965)
[hereinafter New Developments]; Smit, InternationalLitigation Under the United States
Code, 65 COLUM. L. REv. '1015, 1026 n.71 (1965); Comment, Judicial Assistance: Obtaining
Evidence in the United States, Under 28 U.S.C. § 1782, for Use in a Foreign or International Tribunal, 5 B.C. IN'r'L & COMP. L. REv. 175, 182 n.34 (1982).
11. See infra notes 57-69 and accompanying text. See also In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Doc. No. 700, 817 F.2d 1108 (4th Cir. 1987) (Grand Jury investigation of former Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos for possible fraud and corruption); Commission to Take
Evidence Pursuant to Criminal Code of Canada and U.S. Code and Federal Rules, 788 F.2d
566 (9th Cir. 1986) (information gathered by U.S. intelligence sources pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act sought for use in Canadian prosecution of three terrorists
for the murder of a Turkish diplomat in Canada); In re Letters Rogatory From the Supreme
Court of Ontario, Canada, 661 F. Supp. 1168 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (information sought for use
in Canadian income tax evasion prosecution).
12. In re Civil Rogatory Letters Filed by Consulate of United States of Mexico, 640 F.
Supp. 243 (S.D. Tex. 1986). In Mexico the Mexican Consulate filed a letter rogatory on
behalf of a Mexican citizen, to enforce a Mexican judgment against another Mexican citizen
'then living in Texas. The court relied on a letter from the United States Department of
State stating that "foreign judgments, decrees, or orders cannot be enforced . . . by means
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which discovery can be obtained in the United States for use in a
foreign proceeding. In fact, there are treaties and federal statutes
other than section 1782 that can be used to conduct discovery for
use in foreign actions.1 3 However, such treaties and statutes often
require discovery requests to observe certain formal, often burdensome requirements.14 By contrast, section 1782 was intended to
provide an efficient, rapid means for the gathering of information
in both civil and criminal matters by allowing the requesting party
to apply directly to a United States district court.
The statute permits the taking of physical evidence, 15 depositions, and other evidentiary testimony for use in foreign proceedings. The primary thrust of section 1782 is to provide a means to
compel ' uncooperative witnesses and parties to produce informaof a request for judicial assistance ...." Id. at 244. The court went on to point out that
normal means of enforcement (i.e., a civil suit with proper notice and opportunity to contest) were still available to the Mexican citizen.
13. There are other methods of obtaining purely civil discovery. See, e.g., Convention
on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T.
2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444, 847 U.N.T.S. 231 (entered into force for the United States on Oct.
7, 1972) [hereinafter Hague Evidence Convention]. See also Angulo v. Kedzep, 29 Bankr.
417 (S.D. Tex. 1983) (discussing the use of section 304 of the United States Bankruptcy
Code in discovery). The United States is also a signatory to a number of treaties on mutual
assistance in criminal matters. See Ellis & Pisani, The United States Treaties on Mutual
Assistance in Criminal Matters: A Comparative Analysis, 19 INT'L LAW. 189 (1985). See
generally Degnan, Obtaining Witnesses and Documents (Or Things), 108 F.R.D. 223
(1986); Amram, The Proposed Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad, 55 A.B.A. J.
651 (1969) [hereinafter Taking of Evidence]; Amram, The Proposed InternationalConvention on the Service of Documents Abroad, 51 A.B.A. J. 650 (1965) [hereinafter Service of
Documents]; New Developments, supra note 10.
Although there is some overlap among the various "discovery" treaties and § 1782,
neither the treaties nor the statute controls as the sole or primary method for the production of discovery. In Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States District
Court, 107 S.Ct. 2542 (1987), the Supreme Court held that § 1782 was still a viable means
of facilitating discovery in the United States in a foreign legal proceeding.
14. For example, requests made under the Hague Evidence Convention must be executed by letter rogatory sent to the United States Department of Justice. The Department
of Justice processes the request, deciding whether to present it to the court. The letter must
be presented either in French or in English; if the request is in French, it first must be
translated into English before it can be processed, thus prolonging an already time-consuming process. See generally Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 13.
15. The Colombian Minister of Exchange Control attempted to use § 1782 to obtain a
suitcase filled with cash in Fonseca v. Blumenthal, 620 F.2d 322 (2d Cir. 1982). See infra
notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
16. See Comment, supra note 10, at 178. ("The procedures of Section 1782 apply only
when an individual possessing sought-after information is uncooperative.") If the person
refusing to cooperate with the discovery order is a party to the foreign litigation, the courts
will compel discovery only when that party is first adjudged to be in contempt of court for
failing to comply with the discovery order. The courts have held that prior to the citation
for contempt, there is no final, appealable order that they can enforce. See, e.g., In re Let-
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tion. However, the statute provides expressly that any witness who
so wishes may voluntarily produce evidence without a court order.17 As a way to compel discovery, the person, tribunal, or court
desiring information either may file a section 1782 request in the
appropriate district court, or, if a foreign tribunal or court is seized
of the case, have the foreign court send a request by letter
rogatory.'8
Although the statutory language states that any United States
district court judge may issue a section 1782 order to "a foreign or
international tribunal or upon the request of any interested person,"19 the district court seems, actually, to be given complete discretion"° in deciding whether, and to whom it shall grant a section
21
1782 request. The statute states that the district court "may"
grant a request without explaining when it "may" do so. At least
one district court 22 has construed this language to mean that two
explicit prerequisites must be met before a request can be granted:
"(1) the request must be made either through a letter rogatory or
by a foreign or international tribunal or by an interested person;
ters Rogatory from City of Haugesund, Norway, 497 F.2d 378 (9th Cir. 1974); In re Letters
Rogatory Issued by Director of Inspection of Government of India, 385 F.2d 1017 (2d Cir.
1967).
By contrast, if the uncooperative person is not a party to the foreign litigation, the
courts will compel discovery absent a contempt citation. The courts have reasoned that proceedings with respect to that person are final once the request is answered, because they
stand apart from the main case in which the information is to be used, and because one who
is not a party to the foreign action has no compelling interest at stake and would be unlikely
to refuse an order to the point of receiving a contempt citation. See In re Request for Judicial Assistance from Seoul District Criminal Court, Seoul, Korea, 555 F.2d 720 (9th Cir.
1977). This distinction seems unwarranted because the court receiving the § 1782 request is
not seized of the main dispute and the proceedings are final with respect to that court once
the discovery is complete, regardless of whether the uncooperative person is a party to the
foreign proceeding.
17. Section 1782(b) states that it "does not preclude a person within the United States
from voluntarily giving his testimony or statement, or producing a document or other thing,
for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal before any person and in any
manner acceptable to him." 28 U.S.C. § 1782(b) (1982).
18. For an extensive explanation of the mechanics of presenting a § 1782 request to
United States district courts, see Comment, supra note 10.
19. 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (1982).
20. See infra notes 75-79 and accompanying text. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1782
(1982); U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, supra note 5, at 3782-94.
21. The statute states that the "district court of the district in which a person resides
or is found may order him to give his testimony . . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (1982) (emphasis added).
22. In re Request for Assistance From Ministry of Legal Affairs of Trinidad and Tobago, 648 F. Supp. 464 (S.D. Fla. 1986), motion for relief from judg't denied, 117 F.R.D. 177
(S.D. Fla. 1987), afl'd, 848 F.2d 1151 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 784 (1989).
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and (2), the evidence must be for use in a foreign or international
23
tribunal.
After deciding to grant a section 1782 request, the district
court may, if it chooses, appoint a commissioner to facilitate the
gathering of evidence in compliance with its order. The court has
absolute discretion regarding the decisions of whether to appoint a
commissioner, whom to select as the commissioner, ' and what
procedures will be followed in the gathering of the evidence. It is
not required that the evidence be taken in accordance with the
Federal Rules of Procedure (either Civil or Criminal). In fact, the
procedure prescribed by the district court may be that of the foreign tribunal whence the request came.2 5 However, if the court fails
to prescribe an alternate procedure, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will govern, even in criminal cases.2 6
This comment will examine section 1782 jurisprudence and
shall discuss some of the problems that have resulted from the
drafting of the statute and from its application. For instance,
courts have been at a loss to explain the phrase "interested person," leaving unresolved the fundamental issue of who may present
a section 1782 request. In addition, federal courts appear to doubt
that Congress intended to give them the unbridled discretion suggested by the statutory language. As a result, the courts have
struggled to construe2 7 the statute consistently.
23. Id. at 465. Compare the district court's holding in Trinidad with the statutory language, supra note 7.
24. Smit, supra note 10, at 1027.
25. 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (1982).
26. Id.
27. One of the primary functions of a judge is to interpret statutes. Frequently, the
words of a statute are bare until meaning is given to them by judicial construction. In this
context, statutory construction
is the process by which courts analyze statutes and determine their meaning.
The goal of this process is to identify what the legislature intended to accomplish by enacting a particular statute and to interpret the statute in such a way
as to effectuate that intent. To this end, courts over the years have developed
certain canons of construction. These rules of construction are not rules of law
but are "merely axioms of experience." Properly applied, they guide a court as it
goes about its search for that most elusive of quarries, the quarry called legislative intent.
Cross, The Views of a Statutes Draftsman: The Missing Link in the Statutory Interpretation Process, 26 N.H.B.J. 267 (1985) (footnotes omitted).
There are varying views of precisely how much deference is to be accorded the plain
meaning of the words of the statute itself, and how much one is bound by the intent of the
drafters as expressed in the legislative history. Compare Frankfurter, Some Reflections on
the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 522, 543 (1947) ("spurious use of legislative
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Moreover, the statute states that the requested information
shall not be given "in violation of any legally applicable privilege."' 28 This Comment raises the issue of whether state law is to be
considered when privilege is examined. In addition, if the applicable privilege in the foreign jurisdiction is different from a privilege
provided for under United States law (either state or federal), various dangers arise regardless of whether the court chooses to give
effect to the more expansive privilege or to the less expansive privilege. In this connection, a particularly worrisome problem arises
where one of the parties may be given an undue advantage.
A similar problem exists with regard to the court's authority
to appoint a commissioner to collect the requested information.
Because the court may appoint anyone of its choosing to serve as
commissioner, an individual with a personal interest in obtaining
the requested information could be appointed, thereby giving that
person access to information which then could be used by that person in other foreign or domestic litigation.
Finally, in its present form, section 1782 can be utilized by
parties to the foreign action as a method of circumventing the normal restrictions on discovery. Indeed, there is a danger that the
parties could use section 1782 as a ruse to get information for use
in unrelated actions, either in the United States or abroad.
Ultimately, this Comment will propose solutions to some of
the problems presented by the formulation and implementation of
section 1782. It is the conclusion of the authors that Congress
should revise section 1782, and in so doing, adopt the solutions
herein suggested.
history must not swallow the legislation so as to give point to the quip that only when
legislative history is doubtful do you go to the statute.") with Citizens to Preserve Overton
Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 412 (1971) (where the legislative history is ambiguous the
court must look to statutes to find intent"). One author has noted that "there has been a
sharp decline in judicial reliance on the plain meaning rule, which in the past was commonly
employed to preclude resort to legislative history in ascertaining the legislative intent of
'unambiguous' statutory language." Grabow, CongressionalSilence and the Search for Legislative Intent: A Venture Into "Speculative Uncertainties," 64 B.U.L. REV. 737, 737 n.3
(1984).
For discussions of the many theories of statutory construction, see E. CRAWFoRD, THE
CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES (1940); R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF
STATUTES

(1975); J. HURST,

DEALING WITH STATUTES

(1982); Blatt, The History of Statutory

Interpretation;A Study in Form and Substance, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 799 (1985). For a critical analysis of the canons of statutory construction, see Posner, Statutory InterpretationIn the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800 (1953).
28. 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (1982).
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Until 1964, section 1782 contained a requirement that the requested information be for use in "any judicial proceeding pending
in any court in a foreign country." 2 However, by 1964, it had become quite clear that this language was too restrictive because the
statute could not be used to aid the growing number of foreign
administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings.3 0 The legislative history of the 1964 amendment indicates that "[a] rather large number of requests for assistance emanate from investigating magistrates." 31 Because investigating magistrates and other quasiadjudicative bodies were not courts in the strict sense, proceedings
before them could not be characterized as "judicial proceedings" as
contemplated by the 1949 version of the statute. The 1964 amendment attempted to accommodate this perceived new need by rephrasing the statutory language to require only that the information be "for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international
tribunal."3' 2 The legislative history of the 1964 amendment explains
that "the word 'tribunal' is used to make it clear that assistance is
not confined to proceedings before conventional courts. For example, it is intended that the court have discretion to grant assistance
when proceedings are pending before investigating magistrates in
foreign countries."3 3
Obviously, the easy cases under section 1782 have involved instances in which there were actual proceedings pending before a
readily identifiable court or a foreign or international tribunal.3 '
However, the majority of section 1782 cases has involved three distinct but interrelated jurisprudential difficulties: 1) the 1964
amendment appears to have removed the requirement that the
foreign case be pending at the time the section 1782 request is
presented; 2) it is not clear how broadly the drafters intended to
29. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 949 amended by Act of May 24, 1949, ch. 139,
§ 93, 63 Stat. 103.
30. U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, supra note 5, at 3788.
31. Id. (citing LErERs ROGATORY 13 (Grossman ed. 1956)). See infra note 52 and accompanying text.
32. 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (1964).
33. U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, supra note 5, at 3788.
34. Fustok v. Banque Populaire Suisse, 546 F. Supp. 506 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (Swiss court);
In re Letters Rogatory from 9th Criminal Division, Regional Court, Manheim Federal Republic of Germany, 448 F. Supp. 786 (S.D. Fla. 1978) (West German court); In re Request
for Judicial Assistance From the Seoul District Criminal Court, Seoul, Korea, 428 F. Supp.
109 (N.D. Cal.), aff'd, 555 F.2d 720 (9th Cir. 1977) (Korean court).
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define "tribunal," therefore it is difficult for the courts to determine which foreign quasi-administrative bodies ought be considered as tribunals; and 3) the 1964 amendment introduced a statement indicating who may present a section 1782 request: in
essence, either a foreign or international tribunal or an "interested
person." The latter term was defined neither in the statute itself
nor in the legislative history. Thus, it is not at all clear who may
use the mechanisms of section 1782. Each of these problems, analyzed individually, provides an interesting study in jurisprudential
concerns; but taken together, they present a clear threat to some of
the basic notions upon which the U.S. judicial system is founded.
Specifically, if there is no longer a requirement that the foreign
case be pending, and if the terms "interested person" or "tribunal"
are defined broadly (as the courts have done), a foreign prosecutor
could come to the United States and conduct discovery "fishing
expeditions" as a way of finding grounds upon which to base a
prosecution. Such a danger is compounded by the unbridled discretion given under the statute to the district court. Because there
is almost no limit on what the court may deem discoverable,3 5 a
foreign prosecutor could conduct widespread discovery at tremendous cost to the privacy interests and pocketbooks of U.S. citizens.
It is unlikely that Congress intended such a result, even though a
number of section 1782 cases have involved personal and financial
deprivations.
A.

Must the Foreign Case Be Pending?

The language of the 1949 version of section 1782 required that
the sought-after information be "for use in any judicial proceeding
pending in any court ... ."I" However, after the 1964 amendment, the statute required only that the sought-after information
' 37
be "for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal.
Notably, the word "pending" was deleted. Thus, the current wording of the statute, taken literally, represents a drastic departure
from its former version as well as from the underpinnings of the
U.S. legal system. Yet, the significance of the omission of the word
35. The statute indicates that the information cannot be given in violation of any legally applicable privilege. See 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (1982). This provision does not work in
practice and can potentially result in harmful discovery. See infra notes 128-44.
36. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 949 amended by Act of May 24, 1949, ch. 139,
§ 93, 63 Stat. 103.
37. 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (1964).
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"pending" depends, in part, on the theoretical model used to explain the omission.
Recently, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, using
traditional canons of statutory construction, addressed the problem in In re Request for Assistance From Ministry of Legal Affairs of Trinidad and Tobago.3 8 Citing well-known authorities on
statutory construction, the court explained that "[w]hen the legislature deletes certain language as it amends a statute, it generally
indicates an intent to change the meaning of the statute. '39 The
court relied on this argument to support its affirmation of the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida,40
which had refused to quash a subpoena of the bank records of a
U.S. citizen." The Minister of Legal Affairs of Trinidad and Tobago sought the records for use in an investigation of the possible
violation of Trinidadian exchange control laws. The investigation
was merely in the infantile stage and no criminal proceedings were
pending. Nevertheless, the district court granted the request, finding that the statute did not require proceedings to be pending.2
The district and appellate courts relied on the commentary of the
Reporter to the Commission on International Judicial Procedure
that drafted the amendment, who said: "It is not necessary, however, for the proceeding to be pending at the time the evidence is
sought, but only that the evidence is eventually to be used in such
'4 3
a proceeding.
A very different result would have been reached had either the
district court or the court of appeals viewed the 1964 amendment
in a more critical light. Congress played no role in redrafting the
statute. Rather, the new draft was written entirely by an advisory
committee and adopted summarily.'4 Instead of reviewing the bill
for substantive accuracy, Congress merely adopted the drafters' report as the legislative history."5 Therefore, one must question pre38. 848 F.2d 1151 (11th Cir. 1988).
39. Id. at 1154 (citing United States v. Canadian Vinyl Indus., 555 F.2d 806, 810
(C.C.P.A. 1977); 1A SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 22.01 (4th ed. 1984)).
40. 648 F. Supp. 464 (S.D. Fla. 1986).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 467. Accord In re Letter of Request From the Crown Prosecution Service of
the United Kingdom, 683 F. Supp. 841 (D. D.C. 1988).
43. Smit, supra note 10, at 1026 (footnote omitted).
44. Only the Fourth Annual Report of the Commission on International Rules of Judicial Procedure appears in the legislative history of § 1782. See U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS, supra note 5, at 3792.
45. Because the legislative history is the only evidence of Congressional intent, one
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cisely how much Congress truly "intended" to allow the use of section 1782 without a pending proceeding.
One commentator has suggested that a solution to the "pending" problem would be to read the word "eventual" into the statute, thereby forcing the requesting party to make a good faith
showing that the information is intended for eventual use in a foreign proceeding." It is possible that neither Congress nor the
drafters intended to remove the "pending" requirement."7 The legislative history states clearly that "it is intended that the court
• . .grant assistance when proceedings are pending before investigating magistrates.' 48 Hence, it might be better for the courts to
adopt such an interpretation, or ideally, for Congress to make its
intentions known.
B. Who May Make the Request?: The Tribunal/Interested
Person Distinction
The 1964 amendment added a new twist to the statute by purporting to specify who could use the statute to conduct discovery
in the United States. Section 1782 states currently that a request
for information located in the United States must be made either
"by a foreign or international tribunal or upon the application of
any interested person.' '9 The legislative history indicates that the
word "tribunal" was added in place of the word "court" in the
1964 amendment because Congress wanted the assistance of section 1782 to be available to judicial or administrative officials in
quasi-judicial proceedings, in addition to traditional courts.50 The
legislative history indicates, "[flor example, it is intended that the
court have discretion to grant assistance when proceedings are
pending before investigating magistrates in foreign countries." 5 1
must assume that what is stated in the legislative history represents the intent of Congress
at the time that the statute was passed.
46. See generally Comment, supra note 10.
47. Attorneys for movant-appellant Joseph Azar argued this very theory to the Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in In re Request for Assistance From Ministry of Legal
Affairs of Trinidad and Tobago, 648 F. Supp. 464 (S.D. Fla. 1986), motion for relief from
judg't denied, 117 F.R.D. 177 (S.D. Fla. 1987), aff'd, 848 F.2d 1151 (11th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 109 S.Ct. 784 (1989). Miami Rev., Apr. 25, 1988, at 4, col. 2.
48. U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, supra note 5, at 3788 (emphasis added).
49. 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (1982).
50. U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, supra note 5, at 3788. See also In re Letter Rogatory From Justice Court, District of Montreal, Canada, 523 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1975); Comment, supra note 10, at 182-86.
51. U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, supra note 5, at 3788.
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This reference was directed to requests from French juges
d'instruction. The juge is an official who conducts investigations,
interviews witnesses, and performs other quasi-judicial functions.
The juge also has the power -

similar to a U.S. grand jury -

to

evaluate evidence proffered against an individual, and to decide
whether a prosecution should proceed.52 It is not clear whether the
broad powers of the juge encompass the powers of a foreign prosecutor before the prosecutor has filed formal charges in the foreign
tribunal. In this regard, although the juge has investigative powers,
the foreign prosecutor does not seem to possess the same quasiadjudicative power as an investigating magistrate."
The cases construing section 1782 have expended a great deal
of effort trying to determine who is qualified to request assistance. 4 The instant discussion is based upon the premise that
many of these courts, instead of asking whether the requesting
party is a tribunal or an interested person, have skewed the analysis by asking whether the information is for use in a "tribunal."
The first reported case involving a judicial attempt to define
"tribunal" in the context of section 1782 and asking whether the
information sought was for use in a "tribunal," was In re Letters
Rogatory Issued by Directorof Inspection of India.5 5 In that case,
the Indian Tax Assessor was the requesting party, seeking information for proceedings before him. Thus, the request originated
allegedly from a "tribunal." The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit denied the request, concluding that proceedings before an
Indian tax assessor were not "before a tribunal" and, therefore,
that such proceedings did not meet the first test under the statute.
The court reasoned that the tax assessor had no discretion to de52. In civil law systems, "evidence gathering for civil litigation is a judicial function."
Prescott & Alley, Effective Evidence-Taking Under the Hague Convention, 22 INT'L LAW.
939, 959 (1988). In fact, "[t]he taking of evidence by private persons . . . or U.S. government officials . . . is considered an infringement on an area of exclusive judicial sovereignty,
in some cases even where taken from a willing witness." Id. at 959-60. See In re Letters
Rogatory Issued by Director of Inspection of Government of India, 385 F.2d 1017, 1020 (2d
Cir. 1967); Comment, supra note 10, at 182-83 nn. 35-46 and accompanying text; LETTERs
ROGATORY

13 (Grossman ed. 1956), cited in U.S.

CODE CONG.

& ADMIN.

NEws,

supra note 5,

at 3788.
53. But see infra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
54. For a thorough discussion of many of the pre-1982 cases not discussed herein, see
Comment, supra note 10. In this connection, the authors of the instant Comment disagree
respectfully with several of the case holdings and conclusions drawn in Comment, supra
note 10. See generally infra note 61.
55. 385 F.2d 1017 (2d Cir. 1967) (reversing 272 F. Supp. 758 (S.D.N.Y.)).
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cide whether a violation had been committed; his sole responsibilities were to collect taxes owed and protect the government's interest. Further, the court reasoned, the tax assessor did not possess
the power to adjudicate any litigation between the citizen and the
state.6 Therefore, the tax assessor possessed none of the relevant
characteristics of a tribunal.
A similar argument was put forward by the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit in In re Letters of Request to Examine Witnesses From Court of Queen's Bench for Manitoba, Canada,7
where the request for information came from a commission possessing the power to investigate and make recommendations, but
not having power to bring charges or adjudicate the case. The
court of appeals held that bodies which conduct investigations and
make non-binding recommendations on whether to prosecute, but
possess no adjudicative power, do not constitute tribunals. Hence,
the requested information was not for use in a tribunal." Notably,
the court of appeals made no attempt to analyze whether the commission was an "interested party."
By contrast, a Tokyo court requested information on behalf of
a Tokyo prosecutor in In re Letters Rogatory From Tokyo District, Tokyo, Japan." In that case, the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit granted the request, distinguishing its prior decision
in Manitoba, because the Tokyo requesting prosecutor had discretion to decide whether to prosecute. Yet, as in other cases, the information was sought only in furtherance of an investigation; no
charges had yet been filed. Although the court of appeals' result
appears on its face to be inconsistent with the previous cases, the
court seemed actually to base its ruling on the prospective defendant's failure to meet his burden to produce evidence showing why
56. Id. This case is frequently cited for the test of whether there is "the absence of any
degree of separation between the prosecutorial and adjudicative functions [of the requesting
governmental party]." Id. at 1021. However, such a transparent test was not the ground
upon which the court seemed to rest its decision.
57. 488 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1973). In Manitoba, the request came from a commission
that had been established to investigate suspected general wrongdoing in all aspects of the
Pas Forestry and Industrial Complex, a multi-million dollar forestry and industrial project
in Manitoba. The Commission did not have the power to bring charges if such wrongdoing
was found; it merely reported the facts it learned and made non-binding recommendations
on whether to prosecute.
58. Id. at 512.
59. 539 F.2d 1216 (9th Cir. 1976). In Tokyo, the Japanese prosecutor was investigating
officials of U.S.-based Lockheed Aircraft Corporation for bribery of certain Japanese individuals who also were under investigation.
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the matter was "unrelated to a judicial or quasi-judicial contro-

versy." 60 Stated differently, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit seemed concerned that the information was not going to be
used in a proceeding before a "tribunal" because the granting of
such a request would violate the statute."'
Relying on its previous opinion in India, the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit held in Fonseca v. Blumenthal, 2 that an
investigation conducted by the Colombian Superintendent of Exchange Control was not a proceeding before a tribunal; hence, the
request could not be granted. Yet, presumedly, the superintendent had discretion to decide whether to proceed with prosecution,
as did the prosecutor in Tokyo but not the tax assessor in India.
Nevertheless, the court denied the request, premising its decision
on the grounds that the superintendent was responsible solely for
representation of the government's interest and thereby possessed
no adjudicative powers. In truth, the court may have been bothered by the fact that there was no pending case, no present investigation, nor any reasonable suspicion for an investigation of Fonseca. Interestingly, the inquiry of Fonseca started only after the
superintendent attempted to use section 1782 to claim that a suit60. Id. at 1219 (quoting Manitoba, 488 F.2d at 512).
61. Id. Such a conclusion departs clearly from the analysis of Tokyo presented in Comment, supra note 10 where the author states that the court decided not to resolve the primary issue of whether the information was "for use in a proceeding." The Comment takes
out of context the statement, "[t]he use to which the depositions are put in Japan does not
appear presently to deserve the court's attention since the witnesses are neither defendants
nor subjects of investigation." Tokyo, 539 F.2d at 1219. This quotation was actually the
conclusion to a discussion of whether the court should consider whether a § 1782 order here
would violate the fifth amendment rights of the individuals being deposed. The court had
earlier satisfied itself that the information was, according to the requestor, "intended for use
in a tribunal," see Comment supra note 10, at 185, by stating that "[t]he information sought
for the depositions is for use in the completion of the investigation and in future trials."
Tokyo, 539 F.2d at 1218. The objector apparently failed to present evidence to rebut this. It
seems that the true dilemma posed by the decision is that Congress has left the courts with
absolutely no indication as to how to resolve a request emanating from a prosecutor prior to
the filing of a case.
62. 620 F.2d 322 (2d Cir. 1982). The Superintendent of Exchange Control of Colombia
sought to recover, through the use of § 1782, Fonseca's suitcase, which had been rerouted
accidentally to New York by the airline on which Fonseca was travelling. When no one
claimed the suitcase, United States Department of Customs officials seized it and found that
the suitcase contained over $250,000.00 in U.S. currency. Upon learning of the seizure, the
Colombian Superintendent became suspicious and wanted to investigate Fonseca for possible violations of Colombian exchange control laws. Fonseca had not been under investigation prior to the seizure. The Superintendent sought recovery of the suitcase as a way of
beginning the investigation.
63. Id. at 323.
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case containing a large amount of currency was to be the subject of
investigation.
Recently, the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Florida held, on facts similar to Fonseca, that a request
made by the Attorney General and Minister of Legal Affairs of
Trinidad and Tobago should be granted even though the information was to be used in an investigation prior to the filing of the
case." The district court reasoned "that the requested documents
are to be used at trial, and the obvious interest in obtaining these
records in admissible form, also substantiate beyond question that
the documents requested will be 'for use in a proceeding in a foreign tribunal.' ,,65 On the simplest level, Trinidad is consistent
with the holding in Tokyo, in that a request for information by a
prosecutor was granted prior to trial; but because Tokyo was decided actually on the basis of the defendant's failure to meet the
requisite burden of proof, Trinidad extends the statute further
than any other section 1782 case heard previously. The Trinidad
opinion blurs the distinction between the statutory requirements
that the information be for use in a proceeding before a court or
tribunal and that the request come from a "tribunal or interested
person." Moreover, disagreeing with the Fonseca court,6" Judge
Thomas E. Scott, in Trinidad, stated that "the pivotal inquiry...
is whether the evidence sought will eventually be used in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal. 0' 7 Conversely, the
underlying concern in Fonseca seemed to have been that a proceeding had to be pending actually before a tribunal in order to
grant a request.
In another Southern District of Florida case, In re Letter of
Request for Judicial Assistance From the Tribunal Civil de Port6" Judge Edward B. Davis granted
Au-Prince, Republic of Haiti,
the request of the Haitian juge d'instruction who was investigating
former Duvalier government officials.6 9 Judge Davis determined
64. In re Request for Assistance From Ministry of Legal Affairs of Trinidad and Tobago, 648 F. Supp. 464 (S.D. Fla. 1986), motion for relief from judg't denied, 117 F.R.D. 177
(S.D. Fla. 1987), aff'd, 848 F.2d 1151 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 784 (1989).
65. Id. at 466.
66. Id. at 465 n.2.
67. Id. at 467 (emphasis added).
68. 669 F. Supp. 403 (S.D. Fla. 1987).
69. The Haitian juge d'instruction, like the French juge d'instruction, is similar to a
U.S. grand jury in that he "investigates the case, and eventually decides whether any of the
accused should be criminally prosecuted." Id. at 405. For a description of the French juge
d'instruction see Comment, supra note 10. The juge, under French law, also prepares evi-
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that the juge was an investigating magistrate because he "is empowered to evaluate from the information he receives whether or
not there is sufficient evidence to proceed [with criminal
charges]." ° Accordingly, under the district court's calculus, because the juge is an independent investigator, he should be covered by section 1782. In other words, the juge would be a foreign
tribunal making the request for use in proceedings before him.
It is important to note that in Trinidad, the Attorney General
and Minister of Legal Affairs was conducting an investigation
without a pending case; thus, the alternative statutory requirement
of a case before a tribunal or court was not met. Therefore, the
district court was forced to ask whether the Attorney General and
Minister of Legal Affairs was an "interested person." In contrast,
in Haiti, the district court had before it a pending proceeding
before an impartial tribunal and was not forced to make further
inquiry.
C. Suggested Solutions
It is unclear whether the courts have been following any identifiable standard in defining who is an "interested person," under
the statute. Recent section 1782 requests have been received by
U.S. district courts from foreign officials who appear to serve in
prosecutorial capacities. In this regard, the courts have been forced
to choose whether to aid in "fishing expeditions" conducted by
such foreign officials who are attempting to build foreign criminal
cases, a choice due directly to the lack of definition of the term
"interested person" which has, in turn, forced the courts to resort
to the ruse of deciding whether the information is for use in a
tribunal.
One possible solution would be to grant the request when
presented, thereby recognizing that a prosecutor would have access
to the information once the case is filed, either because he would
then be a litigant in a pending proceeding or because the tribunal
itself would make the request. Simply put, to deny a particular
tribunal's section 1782 request for information when the request is
presented prior to trial is merely to advocate form over substance.
This judicial economy argument would prevent the U.S. courts
dence for trial.
70. Haiti, 669 F. Supp. at 406.
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from having to hear the request twice - once during the investigation and once when the proper circumstances are present. This solution also would be consistent with the apparent intent behind
the omission of the term "pending."
Another solution would be to interpret narrowly the term "interested person" to mean either (a) one who has an independent
interest in a potential case (such as an investigating magistrate or
juge); or (b) one who is an actual litigant in a pending case. 1 Although foreign prosecutors would not be covered by such a standard, the possibility of foreign prosecutors obtaining needed information before proceedings are filed is not foreclosed entirely.
Indeed, other means such as international police cooperation and
inter-governmental assistance still would be available to the investigating foreign prosecutor." Moreover, although the instant solution does not eliminate the "form over substance" distinction, it is
more consistent with U.S. notions of due process.
III.

CURRENT PROBLEMS

Recently, a number of cases addressing issues other than the
"tribunal" question have become harbingers of the unforeseen
problems in section 1782. The effect of the statute's broadly
drafted language has been the granting of complete discretion to
the district court in evaluating section 1782 requests. Noticeably
absent are proper guidelines for the exercise of this discretion. The
courts have attempted to construe the statute in a manner suited
to their constitutional role by creating various tests to be used in
evaluating section 1782 requests. However, judicial interpretation
of the statute has not been uniform. In fact, some courts, interpreting the same statutory words, have drawn opposing conclu71. This solution applies only to criminal cases. The statute was amended to eliminate
the term "pending." The omission was aimed at making available to entities like the French
juge d'instruction, the assistance of U.S. courts. See supra notes 36-48. It does not seem
possible that Congress intended to allow a discovery "free-for-all" in civil matters where no
action has been filed. A broad reading of the significance of the omission of the word "pending" to apply to civil as well as criminal matters could permit any overly litigious individual
who entertained such a notion to come to the U.S. and search for actionable cases. But see
Greig & Stahr, U.S. Discovery in Overseas Litigation, INT'L FIN. L. REV. 27, 28 (Jan. 1988)
[hereinafter Overseas Litigation] (implying that this would be not only a plausible interpretation, but an acceptable practice as well). See infra note 166.
72. Smit, supra note 10, at 1034-35. There is some question as to whether such means
are sufficient in light of the pressing need for access to information to be used to arrest the
international drug smuggling problems which have now reached epic proportions.
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sions;73 still other courts have applied the statute in a fashion
which seems at odds with the policy behind it. Therefore, there is a
need for Congress to elucidate standards7 4 upon which district
courts can rely when considering a section 1782 request.
A. Discretion and the Lack of Standards
The statute states, in part, that "The district court of the district in which a person resides or is found may order him to give
his testimony or statement or to produce a document or other
thing for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal."75 The statute itself gives the district court no further guidance as to the granting or denial of a request, and gives the district
court complete discretion in the consideration of a section 1782 request. In this context, a number of interesting questions arise concerning the exercise of discretion. For instance, if the minimal requirements 7 of the statute are met (i.e., where the request comes
from a "foreign or international tribunal" 77 or "any interested person,"78 and the information is for use in a proceeding in a foreign
or international tribunal" ' ) is the district court then compelled to
grant the request? If the answer is in the negative, and the court
denies the request, upon what standards should it base its
decision?
1. Standards Suggested by Congress
The legislative history of section 1782 calls for a literal reading
of the word "may. '8 0 Encompassed within Congress' explanation of
the intent behind the statute is an acknowledgment of the broad
73. Compare Haiti, 669 F. Supp. 403 (state law which provides for a privilege is not
considered when it is inconsistent with federal law) with In re Request for Judicial Assistance from Seoul District Criminal Court, Seoul, Korea, 555 F.2d 720 (9th Cir. 1977) (in the
absence of a federal privilege, state law supplements). Compare In re Court of Commissioner of Patents for Republic of South Africa, 88 F.R.D. 75 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (admissibility
in the foreign court is a requirement) with John Deere, Ltd. v. Sperry Corp., 754 F.2d 132
(3d Cir. 1985) (admissibility is not a requirement).
74. See Comment, supra note 10, at 192-93.
75. 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (1982) (emphasis added).
76. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
77. 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (1982).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws, supra note 5, at 3788.
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discretionary powers given to the district court.81 However, the legislators alluded to several factors which they may have intended as
standards to guide the court:
In exercising its discretionary power, the court may take into
account the nature and attitudes of the government of the country from which the request emanates and the character of the
proceedings in that country, or in the case of proceedings before
an international tribunal, the nature of the tribunal and the
character of the proceedings before it. 2
Congress did not explain what these vague terms meant or how
such terms should be applied. 8 Rather, the individual courts applying these criteria have taken upon themselves the duties of interpreting the ends that the criteria were designed to achieve, and
determining how much weight should be given to each factor. In
the extreme instance, application of these vague guidelines can
lead to judgments of a politically sensitive character 4 because, by
suggesting that the judge examine the nature and attitudes of foreign governments and judicial proceedings, Congress has placed
the judiciary in the position of having to interpret and even determine foreign policy, duties which are not within the province of the
81. Id. See also In re Letters Rogatory From Tokyo District, Tokyo, Japan, 539 F.2d
1216, 1219 (9th Cir. 1976) ("the district court is given discretion in determining whether
letters rogatory should be honored"); John Deere, Ltd. v. Sperry Corp., 100 F.R.D. 712, 714
(E.D. Pa. 1983) ("the use of permissive, as opposed to mandatory language in the provision
makes it clear that there is no automatic right to a section 1782 order. Instead, section 1782
grants the district courts broad discretion to issue or decline to issue, a discovery order.");
In re Request for Judicial Assistance from Seoul District Criminal Court, Seoul, Korea, 428
F. Supp. 109, 112 (N.D. Cal. 1977) ("the discretion to order or deny assistance is lodged in
"); In re Letter Rogatory from Justice Court, District of Montreal,
the district court ....
Canada, 383 F. Supp. 857, 858 (E.D. Mich. 1974) (quoting U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS,
supra note 5, at 3788); In re Letters Rogatory Issued by Director of Inspections of Government of India, 272 F. Supp. 755, 762 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) ("28 U.S.C. § 1782 leaves the granting
of relief to the discretion of the court in each instance.").
82. U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws, supra note 5, at 3788 (emphasis added).
83. Congress states that the court, "in proper cases, may refuse to issue an order or may
impose conditions it deems desirable." Id. Congress then suggests the ambiguous factors,
supra note 81 and accompanying text, presumedly for use in deciding whether to refuse an
order. By contrast, Congress was very specific in suggesting conditions that the district court
might impose, such as "provisions for fees for opponents' counsel, attendance fees of witU.S. CODE CONG. &
nesses, fees for interpreters and transcribers of the testimony .
ADMIN. NEws, supra note 5, at 3788.
84. For example, the Reporter to the Commission that drafted the 1964 amendment to
28 U.S.C. § 1782 commented that "a district court might properly have refused to order the
production of evidence for use in the Soviet Union's criminal prosecution of Gary Powers."
Smit, supra note 10, at 1029 n.82.
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courts under the American system of separation of powers.8
Further, when section 1782 was amended in 1964, Congress
eliminated language which sanctioned judicial cooperation only
where the evidence sought was to be used "in a foreign country
with which the United States is at peace." ' 6 The drafters reasoned
that although the United States might not be technically at war
with another country, relations might be so strained that the
granting of assistance would be inappropriate.8 7 The power to
make such a determination expands substantially the district
court's discretionary role, for the court is then placed in a position
to make outright political decisions. However, this not only violates the separation of powers, but also presents a threat to the
goal of section 1782: to encourage other nations to open their doors
to international discovery by exhibiting the fairness and evenhandedness of U.S. discovery practices. 8 A possible solution to
this quandary is to allow the district court to request an advisory
opinion from the State Department whenever the court senses that
it is being asked to make a politically-sensitive judgment pursuant
85. See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (J. Madison) and No. 48 (J. Madison). Foreign policy is within the purview of the executive and legislative branches. It is not appropriate for the courts to make such decisions. See generally Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S.
996 (1979); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937); United States v. Curtis-Wright
Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936). But cf. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) ("The
doctrine . . .is one of 'political questions,' not one of 'political cases.' ").
86. Act of May 24, 1948, ch. 139, 63 Stat. 103 (1949). See also U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, supra note 5, at 3789.
87. U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, supra note 5, at 3789. See also Smit, supra note
10, at 1028. See generally Trading with the Enemy Act, ch. 106, 40 Stat. 411 (1917) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-40 (1959), as amended 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 6-44 (Supp.
V, 1964)). This concept is illustrated by several hypothetical cases, both civil and criminal,
that could place a federal district court in the position of having to choose between the
United States and a country with which U.S. relations are presently tenuous. For example,
it seems highly unlikely that a U.S. court would grant a § 1782 request from the Nicaraguan
government to aid in a trial of Ronald Reagan for alleged crimes against the Nicaraguan
people, or a request by Panamanian General Manuel Noriega for information to be used in
the prosecution of U.S. citizens in Panama for alleged crimes against the Noriega government. It is equally unlikely that a U.S. court would help Nicaragua locate U.S. assets upon
which to execute pursuant to a civil judgment rendered against the United States in the
International Court of Justice.
88. As Hans Smit, Reporter to the Commission that drafted the 1964 amendments,
noted:
in most cases, however, refusal to lend assistance because of political differences
between the United States and the country from which the request for assistance emanates would be an inappropriate form of retaliation inconsistent with
the general broad-minded attitude of the United States in matters of international cooperation in litigation.
Smit, supra note 10, at 1029 n.82.
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to a section 1782 request.8 9 To date, the courts never have implemented such a plan, but have relied instead on other, ineffective
solutions.
2.

Reciprocity

Thus far, the courts have been reluctant to use as a guideline
the language suggested by Congress. Rather, the courts have devised their own criteria 0 to determine whether a section 1782 request should be granted. 1
89. This concept has been employed by the courts in other circumstances, for example,
the "Bernstein letter exception" to the Act of State Doctrine. For a discussion of the origins
of the Act of State Doctrine see Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897). The "Bernstein letter exception" allows the state department to provide an advisory opinion as to
whether the court may hear an action against a foreign sovereign. The exception arose in
Bernstein v. Nederlandsche-Amerikansche Stoomvaart Maatschappij, 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir.
1954), where the court was willing to hear the case only because the State Department explicitly indicated that to do so would not be detrimental to U.S. foreign policy interests.
(The case concerned a post-WWII claim by a Jewish plaintiff to set aside the forced taking
of his property by the Nazi government.) Thus, one can conclude that, even where a case
concerns the actions of a government that is no longer in existence, U.S. courts are uncomfortable passing judgment regarding the actions of foreign governments and would prefer to
have the help of the State Department.
For the present status of the "Bernstein letter exception," see Alfred Dunhill of
London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976); First City Nat'l Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398
(1964); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 658 F.2d 875 (2d Cir. 1981);
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., 594 F. Supp. 1553
(S.D.N.Y. 1984). See also 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1982).
90. One commentator, contrasting judicial decision-making with legislative decisionmaking, has made painfully clear that it is completely and inappropriate for judges to make
decisions without some objective factors to act as guideposts or safety nets:
The difference between legislative and judicial choice lies rather in the range of
criteria that are available to the decisionmaker for the making of choices ....
It might, for example, be unobjectionable for a legislator to take his fourteenyear-old daughter's advice about how to vote on an issue, but intolerable for a
judge to decide a difficult case on the same basis.
Christie, An Essay on Discretion, 1986 DUKE L.J. 747, 752-53. It is easy to understand why
the courts have struggled so intensively to find concrete standards. See also Dworkin, The
Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REv. 14 (1967), reprinted in R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS
SERIOUSLY 14 (1977).
91. It has been nearly 25 years since Congress suggested the "standards" referred to in
the text preceding supra note 82. In that time, nearly all of the courts interpreting section
1782 have declined to base their decisions upon Congress' standards, yet Congress has taken
no action to let the courts know that the legislature is displeased with the alternative tests
used by the courts. According to one commentator, "Congress' failure to act in response to a
judicial or administrative construction of a statute has been interpreted as legislative acquiescence in that interpretation." Grabow, supra note 27, at 741. Perhaps Congress thinks
that the current version of § 1782 gives the district courts too much discretion and has
acquiesced to the judicially-created tests.
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One point of distinction has been whether the foreign government and its courts or tribunals have been receptive to letters rogatory from the United States (i.e., whether there is demonstrated
reciprocity on the part of the forum country). A few early cases
held that the lack of reciprocity is outcome-determinative: that
where there is no demonstrable policy of reciprocation on the part
of the forum nation, the court must deny the request."2 However,
the majority of courts considering the issue have stated that reciprocity is merely one factor in the determination.9 3 Yet, any consideration of whether reciprocity exists seems to be inconsistent
with the purpose of the statute, for the statute was intended specifically to encourage other nations to follow the lead of the United
States 4 and open their courts to letters rogatory or other discovery
requests.'5
It is not unfair to say that [section 1782] is a one-way street. It
grants wide assistance to others, but demands nothing in return.
It was deliberately drawn this way. . . .However, the sponsors
of the act were not unmindful of the need for parallel action
abroad, so that United States litigants could expect the same
generous treatment. As the Senate Committee stated: "It is
hoped that the initiative taken by the United States in improving its procedures will invite foreign countries similarly to adjust
their procedures."'"
92. See, e.g., John Deere, Ltd. v. Sperry Corp., 100 F.R.D. 712 (E.D. Pa. 1983), rev'd,
754 F.2d 132 (3d Cir. 1985).
93. For example, one court has held that "Congress did not intend section 1782 orders
to depend upon reciprocal agreements. Nor should the practice of [foreign] courts in refusing to render judicial assistance, be the determinative factor in the construction given section 1782 by an American court." John Deere, Ltd. v. Sperry Corp., 754 F.2d 132, 135-36 (3d
Cir. 1985). The court went on to hold that "although the district court was not prohibited
from giving the absence of reciprocity some consideration in the exercise of its discretionary
power, its decision should not have been predicated upon a finding of reciprocity." Id. at
135.
94. According to one of the drafters, the statute was intended to be "an example of
unilateral, non-reciprocal, internal legislation . . .which other countries may wish to follow." New Developments, supra note 10, at 33.
95. See U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, supra note 5, at 3782.
96. Service of Documents, supra note 13, at 651. See also Degnan, supra note 13, at
232 ("the United States decided over a decade ago to act unilaterally, without requiring
reciprocity or even comity."); Letter from Oscar Cox to President John F. Kennedy (Jan. 28,
1963), reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 88, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 17, 19 (1963) ("The commission
hopes that . . . [section 1782] will invite foreign countries similarly to adjust their procedures. . . .Enactment of. . .[section 1782] should encourage foreign nations to follow the
example of the United States." (emphasis added)), also reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS,supra note 5, at 3799.
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Hence, denial of a section 1782 request because the requesting foreign government, court, or tribunal has no history of reciprocity
violates the intent and spirit of this statute.
Furthermore, foreign countries (particularly those with civil
law systems) have not been receptive historically to American pretrial discovery requests where the courts of such countries do not
permit pre-trial discovery and, frequently, do not understand the
practice fully. 7 Because of the strong interest of the United States
in conducting pre-trial discovery abroad, the statute must be applied in a way that sets an example by stimulating reciprocity. The
foreign or domestic policy interests of the United States would not
be served by demanding reciprocity from foreign countries. Hence,
it is inappropriate for U.S. courts to consider the existence of reciprocity in the calculus of determining whether to honor requests
for information based on section 1782.
3.

Due Process of Law

In the attempt to create judicial standards pursuant to section
1782, some courts have taken the legislative history's vague references to "the nature and attitudes of the [foreign] government"' 8
and the "character of the proceedings"" to mean that it is proper
for U.S. courts to consider whether the foreign proceedings comport with American notions of due process of law. For example,
after making mention of these vague references, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in John Deere, Ltd. v. Sperry Corp.,'00
stated that "[a]s long as the discovered information is intended for
use in a foreign proceeding which comports with [our] notions of
due process, the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1782 have been met
and an appropriate order should issue."' 01 This statement was
cited in Trinidad1 0 2 when 'the district court stated that a section
1782 order to produce bank records for possible use in a prosecu97. See In re Letter of Request for Judicial Assistance from Tribunal Civil de Port-auPrince, Republic of Haiti, 669 F. Supp. 403, 408 (S.D. Fla. 1987); Taking of Evidence, supra
note 13. One way to promote understanding of this practice and make foreign courts more
receptive to American pre-trial discovery requests, would be to demonstrate the policy of
the free flow of information in the interest of justice underlying the practice of pre-trial
discovery, and to make a showing of goodwill without regard for reciprocity.
98. U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, supra note 5, at 3788.
99. Id.
100. 754 F.2d 132 (3d Cir. 1985).
101. Id.
102. 117 F.R.D. 177 (S.D. Fla. 1987).
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tion in Trinidad would not "conflict with our concept of fundamental fairness and due process."' '
However, at least one court has been unwilling to consider
whether due process is available in the foreign forum. In Haiti,104
the district court refused to decide the prospective defendant's issue of whether the defendant would receive due process in Haiti if
the requested information eventually provided the basis for a Haitian prosecution of him. 05s The district court opined:
[e]vidence in the record indicates that the proceedings in Haiti
may lack certain procedural protections over the rights of the
accused. However, this Court will not engage in advisory
opinions.
Should the [Haitian prosecutor] decide that prosecution of
[the prospective defendant] is appropriate, [the prospective defendant] may then contest the Haitian judicial procedures [in
the Haitian forum].'l0
Whether the defendant would have a truly adequate opportunity to contend that the requested information was going to be
used improperly is arguable if, in fact, there existed no due process
in the foreign forum. However, the Haiti court was correct nonetheless in refusing to look at the foreign court's proceedings. District courts should question neither the existence nor the adequacy
of due process available in the foreign forum, for the statute
clearly is intended to be a bridge between very different forms of
judicial process. Moreover, the interests of comity and the free flow
of information require tolerance of different legal systems. Further,
the due process inquiry by a district court is, by its very nature,
103. Id. at 180. One court has stated implicitly that the availability of due process in
the foreign court is a proper subject for investigation by U.S. courts. In re Letter Rogatory

from Justice Court, District of Montreal, Canada, 523 F.2d 562, 566 (6th Cir. 1975). In Montreal, the court dismissed the defendant's claim of deprivation of the right of confrontation
in Canadian court, reasoning that the defendant presented no evidence to support his claim
and, therefore, failed to convince the court that he was being deprived of his right.
Presumedly, if the defendant had offered evidence regarding the availability of sixth amendment rights, the court would have considered whether such rights were available in Canadian courts.
104. 669 F. Supp. 403 (S.D. Fla. 1987).
105. Another court has left the issue open, and could be construed as agreeing with the
Haiti opinion. In In re Request for Judicial Assistance from Seoul District Criminal Court,
Seoul, Korea, 555 F.2d 720 (9th Cir. 1977) the court stated that "[i]f departures from our
concepts of fundamental due process and fairness are involved, a different question is
presented - one that is not presented here and which we do not reach." Id. at 724.
106. Haiti, 669 F. Supp. at 406.

454

INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 20:2

extremely political. Questioning whether there exists due process
in the foreign forum risks offending the foreign tribunal as well as
the policy at the heart of the statute. 10 7
Finally, because the due process inquiry is political, one might
presume that the due process inquiry would be made by the State
Department in its determination of whether to provide a district
court with an opinion letter regarding the section 1782 request.10 8
Therefore, a marked lack of due process in the foreign forum
would not remain unnoticed by the United States government. If
the executive branch has chosen to remain silent about the foreign
forum's lack of due process, an anouncement by a district court
that no due process exists could be damaging to the foreign policy
interests of the United States. Thus, the opinion letter solution is
consistent with both section 1782 and the constitutional separation
of powers doctrine, and would prevent the due process issue from
becoming a political problem.
4.

Admissibility

Another question asked by the courts in their search for standards under section 1782 is whether the courts should examine foreign law and decide if the evidence sought would be admissible in
0 e Neither the statute nor the legislathe foreign court or tribunal."
tive history makes reference to the admissibility of evidence as a
criterion for granting a request; rather, the question has been introduced by the courts in deciding section 1782 cases. In In re
Court of the Commissioner of Patents for the Republic of South
Africa,'" the district court held that it was unable to grant the
section 1782 request because it could not determine whether the
evidence sought would be admissible in the South African proceeding. The court stated:
Clearly, if, as in the usual case of letters rogatory, the foreign
tribunal were represented here, the task of this Court would be
very much simpler. Were that the situation, and the foreign triCODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, supra note 5, at 3782.
108. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
109. None of the reported decisions or commentators have discussed the issue of
whether the courts should ask if the information sought would be admissible in U.S. courts.
110. 88 F.R.D. 75 (E.D. Pa. 1980). The material sought was to be used in a pending
South African patent hearing. The plaintiff in the patent action was an American company
with offices in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The defendant in that suit brought a §
1782 request to obtain records from the plaintiff's Pennsylvania offices.

107. See generally U.S.
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bunal could instruct this Court in its law, this Court woud not
hesitate to order discovery consistent with South Africa [sic]
11
law. '
The South Africa court thought that consideration of admissibility
under foreign law was essential to the decision-making process.
However, other courts seem less certain whether such an inquiry
ought be made at all. In Trinidad, the Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit relinquished jurisdiction over the case temporarily to permit the district court to consider whether section 1782
requires an examination of the domestic law of the forum country
to determine whether the information sought is properly discoverable." 2 On remand, the district court held:
As a matter of law and policy, United States courts should refrain from undertaking an extensive analysis of foreign law in
determining whether to honor a request for judicial assistance
and should confine its [sic] inquiry solely to whether the evidence requested comports with the language of 28 U.S.C. § 1782
....
Our courts should not become entangled in interpreting
foreign law when deciding whether to grant requests for judicial
assistance."'
The court of appeals also specifically requested the district
court to determine whether the evidence sought would in fact be
admissible under Trinidad and Tobago law. The court of appeals
was uncertain as to how it planned to rule on the primary issue of
whether foreign law should be considered. Essentially, the court
wanted to know what result would obtain if, in fact, it held that
district courts must decide the question of admissibility. To provide the court of appeals with a complete record upon which to
base its decision, the district court, on remand, conducted extensive hearings with several witnesses who were experts on Trinidad
law. None of the experts agreed on whether the requested evidence
would be admissible, and at the conclusion of the hearings, the district court stated:
[T]he battle of experts witnessed in this case is compelling evidence for abstention and deference [to foreign courts]. This issue is better left to a judicial tribunal in Trinidad, which
through its expertise and knowledge of domestic law, can more
111. Id. at 77 n.1.
112. Trinidad, 117 F.R.D. 177 (S.D. Fla. 1987).
113. Id. at 178.
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fully explore and decide the complex evidentiary and legal issues
presented in this instance. "

Several courts have agreed in principle with the Trinidad district court's holding that it simply is not feasible for federal district courts to examine admissibility because of the hopelessly
complex and particularly burdensome task of construing foreign
law, 1 5 especially where the issue is one of evidentiary admissibility
in the trial court."" As a result, some courts have called for a rule
stating that the issue of admissibility in the foreign forum is simply irrelevant to deciding a section 1782 request. For example, the
court in In re Letters Rogatory from the Supreme Court of Ontario, Canada" ' held:
There is no authority on my
[sic] as to the admissibility or
proceeding. The admissibility
subject solely - is a matter
authorities.

part to make substantive ruling
inadmissibility of evidence in the
or inadmissibility of evidence is
solely for the Canadian Judicial

Congress in the enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 1782 did not intend that a United States District Judge become involved in
making a substantive ruling as to the admissibility or inadmissibility of evidence in a foreign proceeding. " "

The same view was adopted by the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit in overturning the district court opinion in John
Deere,"9 which held that because the information sought seemed
inadmissible in a Canadian court, the section 1782 request could
114. Id. at 180.
115. U.S. lawyers and courts alike have great difficulty mastering and applying the U.S.
federal evidentiary rules and exceptions. It is not unreasonable to assume that similar complexities could exist under foreign evidentiary codes. Certainly, then, U.S. courts are not in
a position to master and apply foreign codes.
116. Very often, evidence which would be inadmissible under one U.S. rule can be admitted under another theory, or to prove another issue. For example, under FED. R. EvD.
802 (the "hearsay" rule), an out-of-court assertion can not be admitted into evidence at trial
if it is offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. However, with a proper foundation,
such evidence might be admissible under one of the various exceptions to the hearsay rule
(e.g., the "business records exception" embodied in FED. R. EvID. 803(6)). Thus, information
that appears inadmissible on its face could be admitted if the proper use is made of it at
trial. The danger, then, is that a U.S. court would deny a § 1782 request because, according
to the court's interpretation of the foreign evidentiary rules, the information appears inadmissible. Yet, if the foreign attorney had obtained the information through discovery, he
might have been able to get it admitted by his skillful use of the governing rules.
117. 661 F. Supp. 1168 (E.D. Mich. 1987).
118. Id. at 1174.
119. 754 F.2d 132 (3d Cir. 1985).
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not be granted.12 The appellate court stated: "[N]or [should federal district courts] determine the admissibility before such tribunals of the evidence sought."' 21
For policy reasons, the courts are well counseled in refusing to
consider the issue of admissibility under foreign law. First, attempts by U.S. courts to construe foreign evidentiary codes and
rules results in a gross waste of judicial resources,' 2 particularly
where even experts on the foreign law in question often disagree on
the potential admissibility of the evidence sought. 2 ' Second, a
clear danger to comity and international relations is presented
where a court familiar with one system of law attempts to declare
the meaning of the laws of another legal system. Consider the district court's comments in Trinidad:
Foreign tribunals are far more competent to decide issues of
their own making than are United States courts. If the situation
were reversed, this court would certainly prefer to interpret
United States
law rather than have a foreign tribunal sit in
4
judgment.3

5. A Proposed Solution to the Problem of Judicial Standards
The tests employed currently in the judicial consideration of
section 1782 requests (i.e., those tests suggested by Congress and
those suggested by the courts) either create a strain on judicial resources or result in the contravention of the statute's policy and
intent. In actuality, the unbridled discretion given to the district
courts under section 1782 has increased the difficulty of obtaining
information located in the United States because, in developing
standards to guide their discretion, the courts have erected roadblocks in the path of the free flow of information.
However, there is an alternative which might prove less destructive, not only in application but in result as well. The alternative is to limit the discretion of the district court. Under this solution, as a general rule, the court should grant a section 1782
120. 100 F.R.D. 712 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
121. John Deere, 754 F.2d at 136. Accord In re Request for Judicial Assistance from
Seoul District Criminal Court, Seoul, Korea, 555 F.2d 720, 723 (9th Cir. 1977); In re Letters
Rogatory from the Tokyo District, Tokyo, Japan, 539 F.2d 1216, 1219 (9th Cir. 1976).
122. See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
123. See text preceeding supra note 114.
124. 117 F.R.D. 177, 178 (S.D. Fla. 1987).
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request - without consideration of the issues of reciprocity, due
process, or admissibility - whenever the request is presented by a
proper entity."2 5 If the district court receives a request that it believes could have political ramifications, then the court may stay
the request pending the issuance of an advisory opinion or amicus
curiae brief from the State Department." 6 However, in the interest
of preserving the independence of the judiciary, a revised version
of section 1782 should indicate that although a State Department
opinion is very persuasive, such an opinion is not binding upon the
court. This solution still leaves some discretion in the hands of the
district court, but removes from the purview of the judiciary the
initial political question. 2 '
B.

Under Whose Law is Privilege Determined?

The second paragraph of subsection (a) of section 1782 states
that the information sought shall not be given "in violation of any
legally applicable privilege."' 8 Because of the ambiguous wording
of that phrase, the law governing the application of privilege, pursuant to a section 1782 request, is difficult for the district court to
delineate. Should the court look to the law of the United States, or
to that of the foreign forum? If U.S. law is to be considered, should
such consideration be limited to federal law, or should it include
state law as well?
The legislative history states that section 1782 "provides for
the recognition of all privileges to which the person may be entitled, including privileges recognized by foreign law. ' 129 Further125. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
126. As noted previously, the opinion letter ostensibly would address politically sensitive issues such as whether due process exists in the foreign forum. See supra note 89 and
accompanying text.
127. Removing this decision from the courts would prevent the United States from
sending mixed signals from the different branches of U.S. government to foreign governments. Under the current scheme, there is danger that foreign governments might perceive
the judgment of the district court as the position of the United States government.
128. 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a). For an excellent discussion of the history of the role of privilege in U.S. court determinations of foreign discovery requests, see generally Smit supra
note 10.
129. U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws, supra note 5, at 3790. Congress indicated that
there must be a reasonable connection between the person asked to produce the evidence
and the state or country under the laws of which the accused claims the possibility of incarceration. To determine whether such a connection exists, the Congress suggested that the
court consider, "the nationality, domicile, forum, and the place of relevant events." Id. at
3792. The mere fact that the Congress suggests the consideration of nationality adds weight
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more, former section 1785,130 which was replaced by the privilege
provision in amended section 1782, specifically stated "under the
laws of any State or Territory of the United States or any foreign
state."1 3 1 In 1964, Congress wrote the privilege provision into section 1782, incorporating former section 1785. In this regard, the
specific reference to "any legally applicable privilege"13 2 was intended to encompass the scope of the former provision. " ' Had
Congress intended to narrow the scope of the privilege to exclude
state law privileges, it would have done so by limiting the language
in section 1782; it did not.13" Therefore, it follows that the court
also must consider whether a state law privilege exists.
Such an issue arose in In re Request for Judicial Assistance
from the Seoul District CriminalCourt, Seoul, Korea, s where the
district court said that, because the statutory language of, and case
law on, section 1782 are "unclear" on the question of applicable
privilege, the court would follow the Ninth Circuit practice of looking at state law in other, non-section 1782 privilege cases. "' Yet, in
In re Letter of Request for Judicial Assistance from Tribunal
13 7
Civil de Port-au-Prince,Republic of Haiti,
the district court
held, contrary to Seoul, that, "the subpoena was issued pursuant
to a federal statute, namely 28 U.S.C. Section 1782. Consequently,
to the argument that foreign law privilege must be considered.
130. 28 U.S.C. § 1785 (1958) stated in pertinent part:
Privilege against incrimination.
A witness shall not be required on examination under letters rogatory to disclose
or produce any evidence tending to incriminate him under the law of any State
or Territory of the United States or any foreign state.
131. Id. (emphasis added).
132. See supra notes 128-29.
133. "The last sentence of subsection (a) of Section 1782 replaces former 28 U.S.C. §
1785, which is repealed by Section 12 of the Act." Smit, supra note 10, at 1029 (footnote
omitted). The drafters only intended omission was that of the vague language of section
1785, which allowed a litigant to cite the law of any country to that person's advantage,
regardless of the cited country's connection to the proceedings. Id. at 1031.
134. Congress declined to name specific privileges because the general doctrinal body of
privilege law was still emerging. In fact, the Federal Rules of Evidence were still in the
conceptual stage when the 1964 amendment to § 1782 was passed. See U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. Naws, supra note 5, at 3790.
135. 428 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal.), aff'd, 555 F.2d 720 (9th Cir. 1977).
136. As a matter of first resort, the courts of the Ninth Circuit follow state law in deciding issues of evidentiary privilege. See, e.g., In re Michaelson, 511 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975). Cf. United States v. Jones, 517 F.2d 666 (5th Cir. 1975)
(after recognizing that the federal common law generally governed the case before it, the
court stated that where there was no common law in the Fifth Circuit on the attorney-client
privilege issues presented, state law should be examined).
137. 669 F. Supp. 403 (S.D. Fla. 1987).
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federal law governs this case. To the extent that state law is inconsistent, it is preempted."1 88 Clearly, there is no problem when the
boundaries of protection are the same under federal and state law.
However, where the limits of federal and state protections differ,
the argument for recognizing the greatest existing privilege
arises.1 39 The concept of recognizing privilege is, in the first instance, meant as a protective measure. Thus, if there is a privilege
available, the protection ought be given.4 0 The same argument
also justifies looking at foreign law privileges as well as U.S. law
privileges pursuant to a section 1782 request. In other words,
where a privilege exists under any law, whether federal, state, or
foreign, that privilege should be recognized. A U.S. court's failure
to recognize a foreign law privilege could be interpreted by foreign
courts as contempt for foreign laws; certainly, the perception that
practice would create would not further the goals of the statute.
Ironically, there also exists the possibility that a broad application of the privilege clause in section 1782 could result in hostility on the part of foreign governments toward the U.S. legal system
and foreign discovery in general. Indeed, if in considering a section
1782 request a district court gives effect to a U.S. privilege which is
not recognized abroad, there is a danger that the foreign courts
could perceive the United States as giving foreign litigants less information than such litigants could receive in their own countries.
Hence, foreign courts could conclude that although the United
States purports to be opening its doors to the world in the interest
of the free flow of information, the broad application of privilege
by U.S. courts pursuant to section 1782 requests is eliciting the
opposite effect. A perception of this nature could offend seriously
138. Id. at 407.
139. In this regard, state law is preempted only where "a 'significant conflict' exists
between an identifiable 'federal policy or interest and the (operation] of state law' . . . or
the application of state law would 'frustrate the specific objectives' of federal legislation."
Boyle v. United Technologies, 108 S. Ct. 2510, 2515 (1988); Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline,
108 S. Ct. 1145 (1988). Moreover, although it is true that "congressional intent to preempt
state law in a particular area may be inferred where the scheme of federal regulation is
sufficiently comprehensive to make reasonable the inference that Congress 'left no room' for
supplementary state regulation," California Fed. Say. & Loan v. Guerra, 107 S. Ct. 683, 689
(1987), such "congressional intent to preempt" cannot be inferred in the instant case. Where
there is no "outright or actual conflict between federal and state law," Louisiana Pub. Serv.
Comm'n v. F.C.C., 106 S. Ct. 1890, 1898 (1986), one can infer that the application of state
privilege law is not preempted in cases involving § 1782 requests for information.
140. But see In re Request for Judicial Assistance from Seoul District Criminal Court,
Seoul, Korea, 428 F. Supp. 109, 112 (N.D. Cal.), aff'd, 555 F.2d 720 (9th Cir. 1977) (any
applicable privilege is not absolute; rather it is to be weighed against other factors).
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the foreign courts and could discourage foreign countries from enacting policies similar to section 1782. " "
Additionally, it can be argued that U.S. courts should not consider foreign law because U.S. courts are not in the best position to
evaluate it. In the extreme situation, where the existence of the
privilege is a central issue in the foreign dispute, examining
whether a privilege exists could involve the district court in a trial
of the merits of the foreign case.14 2 Such a result is undesirable for
three reasons:
1) U.S. district courts are not the best-suited authority to interpret foreign law;
2) Allowing U.S. district courts to interpret and apply foreign
law could lead to inconsistent statements of the rights and obligations of the parties to the foreign action; and,
3) A foreign court might be offended by the lack of comity
displayed by the U.S. court considering the section 1782 request.
Admittedly, the trial-on-the-merits example is at the extreme
of possibility. As a general rule, the district court should consider
foreign law privileges. However, when it appears to a district court
that a trial on the merits must be held to determine whether the
requested information is privileged, the district court might, in its
141. See Smit, supra note 10, at 1033.
142. For example, assume patient X was seeing psychiatrists A and B (partners) in a
foreign country. Over time, the three became friends and saw one another socially. On one
occasion (at a social function), X told A and B certain information. Under the law of the
foreign jurisdiction, therapist/patient privilege covers only information told within the context of treatment.
Sometime later, B moved to the United States. Then, A - without X's consent authored a book containing some of the information told to him by X. Subsequently, X filed
a lawsuit in the foreign country, against A, for breach of the privilege and the harm caused
(i.e., emotional distress and slander). As part of his defense to the lawsuit, A wanted to
depose B about what X had said and the circumstances under which he said it. To that end,
A filed a § 1782 request to depose B in the United States. X tried to prevent the deposition
by asserting that the information sought by A was told in the context of treatment. Therefore, B's testimony still would be covered by the privilege (X did not want B to testify
because X did not want released the remainder of the information which A had not
published).
A U.S. court, in determining whether to grant such a § 1782 request, first must decide
whether the information sought is privileged. To do so, the court must determine whether a
privilege was created when X told the information to A and B (i.e., whether the information
was told in the context of treatment). If so, B's testimony would be prohibited by the privilege. Yet, this is precisely the question at issue in the foreign case. Hence, the U.S. court
would have to decide the merits of the case in order to grant the § 1782 request. Clearly,
such a result is undesirable.
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discretion, simply deny the request. Alternatively, district courts
considering section 1782 requests could elicit expert testimony regarding the application of foreign law privilege under the foreign

law. 143
Thus, there are equally compelling arguments both for and
against the recognition of privileges in general. In assessing
whether the current version of section 1782 best effectuates its intended policy, Congress should consider the extensive body of state
and federal privilege law that has developed since the 1964 amendment to section 1782.244
C. 28 U.S.C. § 1782 Requests Made with Ulterior Motives
The order may . . . direct that the testimony or statement be
given, or the document or other thing be produced, before a person appointed by the court. 4"
This language leaves at the district court's discretion the decisions
of whether to appoint a commissioner, and - if a commissioner is
appointed - who the commissioner will be. The district court may
appoint a federal magistrate 141 to serve as commissioner or it may
appoint some other individual, such as a person suggested by the
143. But see Trinidad, 117 F.R.D. 177 (S.D. Fla. 1987), where the court was caught in a
quagmire of conflicting opinions from experts on foreign law. See supra text preceding note
114.
144. The Federal Rules of Evidence, which codified inter alia privileges recognized by
the federal courts, did not come into existence until 1974, some ten years after the privilege
clause was written into § 1782.
145. 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (1982). See also New Developments, supra note 10, at 31.
146. The court may appoint as commissioner a federal magistrate. Federal magistrates
act as support personnel for district court judges. The position of magistrate was created in
1968 by the Federal Magistrates Act, Pub. L. No. 90-578, 82 Stat. 1108 (1968) (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 636 (1968)). Included in the list of "experimental" duties that the judge may assign
to the magistrate is the "supervision of proceedings or requests for letters rogatory in civil
or criminal cases (a special designation is required by the district court under 28 U.S.C. §
1782(a).]." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3) (1968) See also Sear, Supporting Personnel, in Proceedings of Seminar for Newly Appointed District Judges, 75 F.R.D. 89, 237-59 (1976). Although the magistrate may require the parties to do what is necessary to carry out the
district court's § 1782 order, it is not within the magistrate's power to deny the request after
the judge has granted it. See In re Request for Judicial Assistance from the Seoul District
Criminal Court, Seoul, Korea, 428 F. Supp. 109, 112 (N.D. Cal.), aff'd, 555 F.2d 720 (9th Cir.
1977) (the discovery request from the Korean court stated that it would expire December
31, 1976; thereafter a new request would have to issue if discovery had not yet been completed. In January 1977, the magistrate charged with complying with the district court's
discovery order stated that the request would not be honored because the underlying writ
had expired. The district court overruled the magistrate, holding that, in denying the request, the magistrate had exceeded his authority under the statute).
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requesting party or a person designated by foreign law to give
oaths and take evidence. 147 In its present form, section 1782 is in
several ways susceptible to abuse.
1.

Commissioner's Personal Use of Information Discovered

There is the potential for a conflict of interest when the person appointed as commissioner has an interest in other pending or
future U.S. litigation outside of, but similar to, the case for which
the information is requested, because the information that such a
commissioner learns may later be used improperly in the other litigation. Moreover, the commissioner maintains responsibility for
ensuring that the district court's section 1782 order is complied
with fully. Presumedly, this responsibility includes compliance
with all safeguards ordered to protect the rights of the parties,

such as protecting privileged information.

48

To place in charge of the enforcement and protection of rights
and privileges a commissioner who might have an interest in obtaining that information for other purposes, is to put the proverbial fox in the henhouse. Yet, this very situation occurred in Haiti,149 where the law firm of Stroock & Stroock & Lavan (Stroock)
was appointed commissioner to oversee the gathering of information about the U.S. bank records of former Duvalier government
147. U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, supra note 5, at 3789.
148. Contra Republic of Haiti v. Crown Charters, 667 F. Supp. 839 (S.D. Fla. 1987)
where the court stated that the "commissioner's primary function is to represent the interests of Haiti in conducting the requested discovery." Id. at 848.
In Haiti, Crown Charters was the defendant in an action brought by the current Haitian government to recover the yacht "Niki." The vessel allegedly was purchased by former
Haitian President Jean-Claude Duvalier with funds embezzled from Haiti, and later was
sold to Crown for $1 million. The Haitian government was represented originally by the law
firm of Stroock & Stroock & Lavan, see infra notes 149-50 and accompanying text, but the
firm withdrew due to an unrelated conflict-of-interest. Stroock maintained contact with Haiti's new counsel, with which it shared information. This fact was distressing particularly to
the defendant, because Stroock had been appointed as commissioner to gather evidence in a
§ 1782 case with direct relevance to the action in which the defendant was involved. See In
re Letter of Request for Judicial Assistance from Tribunal Civil de Port-au-Prince, Republic
of Haiti, 669 F. Supp. 403 (S.D. Fla. 1987); infra notes 149-50 and accompanying text.
Crown moved to depose the Stroock attorneys so that Haiti's present counsel did not
have an unfair advantage over it in the instant litigation. The court commented that there
was no impropriety in having Stroock sit as commissioner, yet reasoned that the imbalance
of information could be detrimental to Crown. Thus, the court allowed Crown to depose the
Stroock attorneys. For an interesting discussion of the case from the perspective of the impact on Florida law, see Jarvis, InternationalLaw: 1987 Survey of FloridaLaw, 12 NOVA L.
REy. 547 (1988).
149. 669 F. Supp. 403.
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officials. In Haiti one such former official argued that Stroock was
not a proper party to sit as commissioner because the firm was
representing the present government of Haiti in its efforts to collect funds taken out of Haiti by the ousted Duvalier regime.
Stroock was to receive a percentage of all monies that the firm assisted in recovering.1 50 Clearly, then, if Stroock was in charge of
conducting discovery of the former Duvalier official's bank records,
the firm was in a position to learn information from which it could
have profited.15 1 However, the Haiti court held:
[t]his argument is unpersuasive in light of this Court's recent
ruling that even where the party requesting judicial assistance is
an "interested party" and not "neutral," the grant of assistance
under Section 1782 is appropriate. In re Request for Assistance
from Ministry of Legal Affairs of Trinidad and Tobago."2
Simply stated, the Haiti court misconstrued the holding in
Trinidad. The Haiti court was apparently under the impression
that the Trinidad opinion was dispelling the notion that the section 1782 request had to come from an impartial tribunal; this was
15
simply not the issue at hand in Trinidad.
3 In addition, the statute expressly states that a litigant before a tribunal may request
information. Thus, where a litigant is obviously an "interested"
party, the Haiti court's conclusion is not only legally unsound but
superfluous as well. The court's holding in Trinidad is not applicable to the question of whether the commissioner may be an interested, non-neutral party. Such an interpretation would allow anyone who merely had a passing interest in the information, for use
in this or other proceedings, to act as commissioner where that
person is an "interested party."
In a worst-case scenario, U.S. district courts ordering discovery pursuant to section 1782 could become information clearinghouses where discovery can be obtained by anyone with an "interest" in receiving it. Taken to the logical extreme, such a policy
150. Id. at 407.
151. The court chose not to give effect to state law privilege, see supra notes 137-40
and accompanying text. However, in discussing state law, Judge Davis made clear that the
information sought would have been privileged under Florida law. Consequently, by sitting
as commissioner, Stroock was able to discover privileged matter. Stroock could use this information to great advantage in its U.S. litigation to recover embezzled funds on behalf of
the current Haitian government.
152. Haiti, 669 F. Supp. at 407.
153. See supra notes 37-47 and accompanying text.
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could encourage a discovery-for-sale network to take root.'" Interested parties could obtain information and disclose such information to others who are conducting "fishing expeditions." As a way
of preventing this serious misuse of section 1782, the district court
should avoid appointing as commissioner a person with a current
or potential "interest" in the information discoverable pursuant to
the district court's order. In this regard, if a person with an interest in the requested information was appointed nonetheless, that
person should remove himself from the case.
2.

Litigant's Use of the Information Obtained

The district court has complete discretion to prescribe the
procedure to be followed in carrying out the order. Section 1782(a):
permits, but does not command, following the foreign or international practice. If the court fails to prescribe the procedure,
the appropriate provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are to be followed, irrespective of whether the foreign or
international proceeding or investigation is of a criminal, civil,
administrative, or other nature.'
This provision was drafted probably to accommodate the varied
forms of procedure around the world. The evidentiary codes of the
many different legal systems of the world are complex and often
formalistic. If the statute were to mandate that the information
154. One might argue that as long as the shared information is not privileged matter,
sharing of information is actually beneficial. Such a contention is based on the notion of free
flow of information in the interest of having the decisionmaker possess all of the relevant
facts to facilitate an informed decision. Ward v. Ford Motor Co., 93 F.R.D. 579, 580 (D.
Colo. 1982) ("Efficient administration of justice requires that courts encourage, not hamstring, information exchanges ....
").
Another argument is presented in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 106 F.R.D. 573 (D. N.J.
1985). The court in Cipollone refused to order the plaintiff's attorney not to disclose information which indicated that tobacco companies had concealed information regarding the
risks of smoking. The court was concerned that other, similarly situated litigants might not
have the resources to conduct similar discovery to recover such information for use in other
suits. (However, the court issued a caveat intimating that the Supreme Court has abandoned the notion that discovery should be presumed "open.") Id. at 587 (citing Seattle
Times v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984)). The Cipollone court was sensitive to the problem
of discovery-for-sale networks: "[A]t least one court has permitted the very evil here cited
by defendants - the sale pf discovery materials." Cipollone, 106 F.R.D. at 586 (discussing
Upjohn Co. Antibiotic Cleocin Prods. Liab. Litig. 81 F.R.D. 482, 484-85 (E.D. Mich. 1979),
aff'd, 664 F.2d 114 (6th Cir. 1981)). However, the Cipollone court cited a number of decisions indicating that discovery should occur unless it is clear that the present proceeding is
a sham designed to get information.
155. U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, supra note 5, at 3789.
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had to be taken in accordance with domestic rules of procedure,
the information could be rendered useless in the foreign court.15
Consequently, the district court maintains discretion in determining the form of the order.
Difficulties have arisen from the fact that an order for discovery issued pursuant to section 1782 does not have to comply with
the foreign forum's process. Indeed, litigants making requests
under section 1782 have been accused of conducting ad hoc discovery in an attempt to circumvent the governing foreign court's prescribed process regarding the gathering of evidence. In Verson Int'l
Ltd. v. Allied Prods. Corp.,57 the district court refused to grant an
order permitting the requesting litigant to take an ex parte deposition because the law of the forum nation would not permit the
15
compulsion of a third party to sit for an ex parte statement.
Thus, the court entered an order commanding that the deposition
be taken in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
reasoning that to do so would avoid offending English law.1 59
Foreign courts also have recognized the problem of differing
discovery procedures among differing legal systems. In South Carolina Ins. Co. v. Assurantie Maatschapij "De Zeven Provincien"
NV, 160 the plaintiff, an insurance carrier, sought an injunction
from the British courts as a method of preventing the defendant
from initiating a section 1782 request to depose third parties located in the United States.' The House of Lords refused to issue
the injunction and held that while procedural differences regarding
discovery existed between the United States and England, the
Lords would not prevent a party from gathering information necessary to prove its case. 62 Interestingly, although the House of Lords
refused to aid the plaintiff in halting the depositions, 6 s neither
would the Lords help the defendant by ordering the discovery. It is
important to note that the House of Lords found that an application under section 1782 to do what could not be done under British
156. See New Developments, supra note 10, at 31. See also supra notes 115-16.
157. No. 87-C-7549 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 25, 1987) (WESTLAW, Genfed lib. #17837).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. [1987] 1 App. Cas. 24 (H.L.).
161. Id. The U.S. district court stayed its decision on the § 1782 petition pending the
House of Lords' decision.
162. Id.
163. "The South Carolina case thus establishes that, except in extraordinary circumstances, U.K. courts will not enjoin attempts by U.K. litigants to obtain evidence from third
parties in the United States under § 1782." Overseas Litigation, supra note 71, at 28.
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law was not an affront to the sovereignty of the English courts. 6 "
Unfortunately, other foreign courts may not maintain the same
favorable view, and might consider the section 1782 request to be
an attempt to evade the constraints of the foreign forum's process.
There also exists the possibility that litigants before the foreign court could use section 1782 as a device to get around U.S.
discovery rules. For example, where one party is involved in concurrent, related actions pending before both U.S. and foreign
courts, that party might be tempted to file a section 1782 request
as a way of obtaining information otherwise unavailable under the
appropriate U.S. discovery rules. The requesting party then could
use the discovered information to his advantage in the U.S. proceeding. This scenario is particularly worrisome where the particular U.S. court granted the section 1782 request in violation of some
applicable U.S. privilege.'
Finally, it is possible that a litigant in a foreign action would
file a section 1782 request to obtain information which can be utilized as the basis for a legal action in the United States. Such
abuse of section 1782 is at odds with U.S. notions of fair play and
the manner in which U.S. courts permit discovery to be taken.""
164. "[I]t could not possibly have been said that there had been any interference with
the English court's control of its own process." South Carolina, [19871 1 App. Cas. at 42.
165. See supra note 140 and accompanying text. If the information is of a nature that
harm can be avoided by quashing such material at trial (e.g., evidence seized in violation of
the fourth amendment) the concern is not so grave. However, where harm can be avoided
only by refusing to release the information, such as material covered under the work product privilege, FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b), there is genuine cause for concern.
It can be argued that if the information was given as a result of a court order issued
pursuant to § 1782, the order constitutes judicially-conferred immunity. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.
§ 6002 (1970). However, once the information becomes part of the public record in a foreign
court, the privilege no longer exists because the information is no longer concealed.
166. But see Overseas Litigation,supra note 71, at 28, suggesting that this is perfectly
appropriate behavior. See also supra note 72. Such conduct has been forbidden strictly in
other contexts. For example, "the powers of the grand jury may be used only to further its
investigation, and. . . a court may quash a subpoena used for some other purpose." United
States v. (Under Seal) Antitrust Grand Jury Investigation, 714 F.2d 347, 349 (4th Cir. 1983).
"[PIractices which do not aid the grand jury in its quest for information bearing on the
decision to indict are forbidden. This includes use of the grand jury by the prosecutor ...
as a means of civil or criminal discovery." Id. (citing United States v. Procter & Gamble, 356
U.S. 677 (1958) (other citations omitted)). Moreover, the Right to Financial Privacy Act of
1978 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 3420 (1982)), specifically provides that when a grand jury subpoenas bank records, those records "shall be used only for the purpose. . . of prosecuting a
crime for which that indictment or presentment is issued.
... 12 U.S.C. § 3420 (2) (1982).
However, this argument faces difficulty when the threat of a second suit is not yet realized. See Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Addressed to Armada Petroleum Corp., 520
F. Supp. 253 (S.D. Tex. 1981), where the court refused to quash a grand jury subpoena,
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Unfortunately, this scenario could become more commonplace as
the federal courts apply, with increasing frequency, sanctions
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. 87 Rule 11 requires an
attorney to maintain a good-faith belief in the validity of what he
and his client are asserting.6 8 Hence, where an attorney in the
United States knows that he does not have enough information to
support a good faith claim, the attorney might be tempted to file
the case in a foreign court and make a section 1782 request to obtain information upon which to build a case in a U.S. court.
It would be impractical, if not impossible, for Congress to prescribe, in advance, the appropriate procedure to avoid the aforementioned difficulties. However, district courts should be sensitive
particularly to the possibility that the pertinent section 1782 request is being used to circumvent foreign or domestic restrictions
on discovery. To aid the district court in such a situation, Congress
could prescribe one of the following standards:
1) upon motion by the other party, the requesting party
should be forced to make a good faith showing that the information sought is for use in the foreign proceeding; or,
2) the district court should grant the request only where there
is a reasonable basis for believing that the information sought is
for use in the foreign proceeding; or
3) the district court should grant the request only where there
exists a reasonable possibility that the information will be used in
the foreign proceeding.
distinguishing Procter & Gamble because "the latter company was not indicted by a grand
jury, but was subsequently sued in a civil action. Indeed, Armada might be indicted and can
only hypothesize concerning a civil suit." Grand Jury Subpoena, 520 F. Supp. at 255. Thus,
it seems that the threat of prosecution must be real. See Johnson Foils, Inc. v. Huyck,
Corp., 61 F.R.D. 405, 410 (N.D.N.Y. 1973) ("unless it can be shown that this discovering
party is exploiting the instant litigation solely to assist in other litigation before a foreign
forum, the federal courts do not allow full use of the information in other forums.").
167. Rule 11 states:
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him that. . . to
the best of his knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith
argument for extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is
not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation . . . . If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court. . . shall impose
upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate
sanction . . ..
FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
168. Id.
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Thus, the district court would not need to question for what
other purposes the information sought might be utilized as long as
such information is for use in the foreign proceeding.1 69 Where the
district court finds that the requesting party cannot satisfy one of
the standards, the court should apply its discretion and deny the
request. In context, the suggested standards would constitute limited exceptions to the rule proposed previously, in essence, that the
district court grant all requests meeting the two statutory requirements unless the court is informed otherwise by the State Department and wishes to follow its advice on the matter.11
IV.

CONCLUSION

Congress had in mind a noble purpose when it passed section
1782. The statute was to be a spark which other nations would kindle, joining the United States in clearing the path for the free flow
of information on an international scale. Unfortunately, the present version of the statute is not well suited to the facilitation of
such a task. Indeed, as the statute is used with increasing frequency, the possibilities for abuse shall become more apparent.
This Comment has noted both the current problems under section
1782 and the ptoblems which the courts may face in the near future, and has suggested some possible remedies. This Comment
also has explained that there is a clear need for Congressional
action.
Section 1782 should be reexamined and redrafted with greater
specificity,1 71 bearing in mind the following:
169. Each of these proposed standards represents a relevancy test. The standards differ
only in the degree of proof which the party must present. The standard for appellate review
would remain "abuse of discretion."
170. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
171. The abstract nature of the words of the statute necessitates that Congress take
affirmative steps to memorialize its intent by doing more than simply adopting the drafters'
statement of purpose:
Legislators should take an active role in preserving and documenting a record of
their purpose in drafting and enacting legislation. By providing the courts with a
panoply of reliable legislative history, the legislature will enable judges to understand and apply legislative intent, furthering the constitutional mandate for separation of powers.
Rhodes & Seereiter, The Search for Legislative Intent: Aids to Statutory Construction in
Florida - An Update, 13 FLA. ST. L. REV. 485, 514 (1986).
"[Elven the most basic general principles of statutory construction must yield to clear
contrary evidence of legislative intent." Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Nat'l Ass'n R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458 (1974). Moreover:
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1) There are competing arguments as to whether the phrase
"interested person" should apply to a foreign prosecutor seeking
the aid of section 1782 to build his case before proceedings have
begun:
a) Argument that the request be denied: The prosecutor
should rely upon international police cooperation or intergovernmental assistance to obtain information with which to create his
case. This argument takes into account strong U.S. concerns regarding protection of privacy and protection from unnecessary governmental interference." 2
b) Argument that the court grant the request: Once the
case is pending, the prosecutor would be a litigant before the foreign tribunal and would then be entitled to assistance under section 1782. In this regard, it is pointless to deny the prosecutor's
present request where the prosecutor will be later entitled to the
section 1782 order. This argument advocates substance over
form1 73 and, by eliminating the need for the court to examine the
request twice, takes into account the scarcity of judicial
The words of a statute are always relevant, often decisive, and usually the most
important evidence of what the statute was meant to accomplish. I merely object
to the proposition that one must always begin with the words, and I am reasonably confident that more often than not the judge - the good judge as well as the
bad judge - in fact begins somewhere else. . . . [Furthermore, because,] the statute is a compromise between one group of legislators that holds a simple remedial objective but lacks a majority and another group that has reservations about
the objective, a court that construed the statute broadly would upset the compromise that the statute was intended to embody.
Posner, supra note 27, at 808-89.
Another interesting view of statutory interpretation is presented in Eskridge, Dynamic
Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479 (1987):

Like other texts, statutes are dynamic things: they have different meanings to
different people at different times, and in different legal and societal contexts. It
is a significant departure from current doctrine to assert, as I do, that federal
courts should interpret statutes in light of their current as well as historical
context.
Id. at 1554. As Justice Holmes once observed: "A word is not a crystal, transparent and
unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in color and content
according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used." Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S.
418, 425 (1918).
172. See generally U.S. CONST. amends. I-X.
173. Formal justice is associated with rules that are based on ascertainable facts, restrain official arbitrariness, and provide certainty. Substantive justice is associated with
standards that direct courts to assess a particular fact situation in terms of the overall
objectives of the legal order. In the modern consciousness neither form nor substance
emerges completely triumphant. . . . In the realm of statutory interpretation, formal justice
is associated with following the letter of the statute and substantive justice with its "spirit."
Blatt, supra note 27, at 799-800.
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resources.'
2) If a section 1782 request calls for a political decision, the
district court should seek an amicus curiae brief or opinion from
the executive branch (i.e., the State Department) as a way of removing political questions from consideration by the judiciary and
preventing U.S. foreign policy inconsistencies. However, the court
should retain discretion in deciding how much deference to give
the advisory opinion.
3) The court should consider all applicable privileges - federal, state, and foreign - in reaching a decision. However, where
the privilege inquiry threatens to force the U.S. court to hear the
merits of the case, the court should use its discretion and deny the
request.
4) The court should not appoint as commissioner for the gathering of information a person who has an interest in obtaining such
information for his or her own use.
5) There are several possible alternatives which could be
adopted in response to the danger that the information to be discovered is desired by the requesting party for purposes other than
the claimed foreign litigation:
a) Upon motion by the other party, the requesting party
should be forced to make a good faith showing that the information is sought for use in the foreign proceeding; or,
b) The district court should grant the request only where
there is a reasonable basis for believing that the information
sought is for use in the foreign proceeding; or
c) The district court should grant the request only where
there exists a reasonable possibility that the information will be
used in the foreign proceeding.
Because of the growing need for greater cooperation in transnational litigation, the legal system of each nation must change to
accommodate such cooperation. The passage of section 1782 was
174. Ultimately, the decision regarding adoption of either of these solutions is a matter
of policy and, therefore, must be performed by Congress.
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the first step toward that goal; a revision of the statute consistent
with the solutions here proposed would be another.
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